

# DPR Proposed Pathogen Control Criteria §64669.45 and portions of §64669.80 & §64669.85

Bob Hultquist, PE  
Principal Engineer (ret)

Saeed Hafeznezami, PhD, PE  
Recycled Water Unit



# Pathogen Control Criteria Overview

- Pathogen reduction targets to achieve specific health risk goals
  - Reference Pathogens
  - Tolerable Risk Goal
  - LRVs based on potential occurrence and safe drinking water level
- Treatment approval
  - Reliability - multi-barrier treatment, diverse treatment mechanisms, and extra log reduction capacity
  - Validate treatment LRVs to ensure effective pathogen removal
- System Control
  - On-line monitoring for critical control point critical limits
  - Control system that responds appropriately to LR deficiencies

# Reference Pathogens

- Municipal wastewater is considered a surface water.
- Pathogens that are regulated in the Federal and California surface water treatment regulations:
  - *Giardia cysts*
  - *Cryptosporidium oocysts*
  - enteric virus

# Risk goal

- Annual risk target of  $10^{-4}$  infections per person per year based on guidance from the USEPA in developing the Surface Water Treatment Rule.
- State Water Board decided to specify a maximum daily risk of infection target:
  - $10^{-4}$  infections per person per year divided by 365 days to yield a daily risk target of  $2.7 \times 10^{-7}$  infections per person per day.

# Derivation of Log Reduction Values (LRVs)

- Point estimate-based quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA)

	Enteric virus	<i>Giardia</i>	<i>Cryptosporidium</i>
Raw sewage maximum density	1E09 virus GC/L <sup>(a)</sup>	1E05 cysts/L <sup>(b)</sup>	1E04 oocysts/L <sup>(c)</sup>
Tolerable drinking water density	3.3E-07 virus/L <sup>(d)</sup>	6.8E-06 cysts/L <sup>(e)</sup>	1.4E-07 oocysts/L <sup>(f)</sup>
Ratio of drinking water to sewage density	3.3E-16	6.8E-11	1.4E-11
Required log reduction	16	10	11

- (a) The maximum Norovirus concentration in gene copies per liter (GC/L) based on a literature review and meta-analysis presented by [Eftim et al. \(2017\)](#), Table 2.
- (b) The high cyst concentrations found in untreated wastewater presented in [Water Reuse, Metcalf and Eddy, 2007](#), Table 3-7.
- (c) An oocyst concentration based on Norway ([Robertson et al., 2006](#)) and Melbourne ([Tetra Tech, 2011](#)) data, rounded up.
- (d) Calculated using the dose-response model described by [Teunis et al. \(2008\)](#), page 1471.
- (e) Calculated using the exponential dose-response model described [Regli et al. \(1991\)](#), Table 1.
- (f) Calculated using the beta-Poisson dose-response model described by [Messner et al. \(2016\)](#), Table II.

# Raw Sewage Maximum Pathogen Densities

- Based on the results of DPR-1 research project and literature review:

Enteric virus	Giardia	Cryptosporidium
1E09 virus GC/L	1E05 cysts/L	1E04 oocysts/L

# Tolerable Drinking Water Pathogen Densities

- Calculated the tolerable drinking water densities for each pathogen using accepted dose-response relationships.
- Assumptions used in calculating the tolerable drinking water densities:
  - Annual consumption of 2 liters of water per day for 365 days
  - Dose-response model for enteric virus: Hypergeometric (Teunis et al., 2008)
  - Dose-response model for Giardia: Exponential (Teunis et al., 1997; Regli et al., 1991)
  - Dose-response model for Cryptosporidium: Beta-Poisson (Messner et al., 2016)

- Tolerable drinking water densities:

Enteric virus	Giardia	Cryptosporidium
3.3E-07 virus/L	6.8E-06 cysts/L	1.4E-07 oocysts/L

# Ratios of Drinking Water to Sewage Densities

	Enteric virus	Giardia	Cryptosporidium
Raw sewage maximum density	1E09 virus GC/L	1E05 cysts/L	1E04 oocysts/L
Tolerable drinking water density	3.3E-07 virus/L	6.8E-06 cysts/L	1.4E-07 oocysts/L
Required log reduction to ensure microbiologically safe drinking water	16	10	11



# DPR-1 Research Project: DPRisk Tool

## DPRisk

version 1.0.1 (11.05.2020)

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### Model Specification

Raw Wastewater Pathogen Concentrations

Treatment Train

Treatment Failure

Management Barriers

Exposure

Dose-Response

Results

**PATTP Output**

QMRA Output

Summary of PATTP and QMRA Output

Comparison of Risk Curves

### Enteric virus

Summary statistics for Log Removal Values to achieve  $10^{-4}$  annual risk:

	N	sd	mean	min	1st	5th	25th	median	75th	90th
1	10000	0	15.4862	15.4862	15.4862	15.4862	15.4862	15.4862	15.4862	15.4862
			95th	99th	max					
1	15.4862	15.4862	15.4862							

### Giardia

Summary statistics for Log Removal Values to achieve  $10^{-4}$  annual risk:

	N	sd	mean	min	1st	5th	25th	median	75th	90th
1	10000	0	10.1609	10.1609	10.1609	10.1609	10.1609	10.1609	10.1609	10.1609
			95th	99th	max					
1	10.1609	10.1609	10.1609							

### Cryptosporidium

Summary statistics for Log Removal Values to achieve  $10^{-4}$  annual risk:

	N	sd	mean	min	1st	5th	25th	median	75th	90th
1	10000	0	10.8448	10.8448	10.8448	10.8448	10.8448	10.8448	10.8448	10.8448
			95th	99th	max					
1	10.8448	10.8448	10.8448							

# Reliability

- The 2016 Expert Panel called for achieving reliability by “using a treatment train...with multiple, independent treatment barriers (i.e., redundancy) that meet performance criteria greater than the public health threshold log<sub>10</sub> reduction value (LRV) goals established for microorganisms”
- To do so, State Water Board determined extra log reduction capacity beyond the required log reductions using a QMRA incorporating a conservative critical treatment failure scenario for each reference pathogen.
- State Water Board utilized the DPRisk tool for this purpose.

# Failure Scenario

## DPRisk

**Magnitude:** Specify a percentage, representing the reduction in log removal (e.g. 100% is a full failure LRV = 0, 50% reduced a LRV of 4 to  $4 \times (100 - 50) / 100 = 2$ ).

Percentage failure (0 - 100):

**Duration:** Select how long it will last (in hours, max is 24 hrs)

Specify hours:



0.25 2.75 5.25 7.75 10.25 12.75 15.25 17.75 20.25 22.75 24

**Frequency:**

Should the frequency be applied as a daily probability of a failure or as a deterministic number of failure days per year:

Select how many failures per process per year

Number of failures:

Critical Process	UV/AOP
Maximum loss of LRV	6 log
Process failure magnitude	100% (loss of all 6 logs)
Process failure duration	15 minutes
Process failure frequency	Once a year

# Extra LRVs

- Additional LRVs required to be provided by the treatment train to ensure the calculated risk of infection associated with the failure scenario does not exceed a daily threshold of 2.7E-07:

	Enteric virus	Giardia	Cryptosporidium
Excess log capacity to achieve a 2.7E-07 daily risk with failure scenario	4	4	4


# Pathogen Reduction Treatment

## §64669.45(a)(1&2)

- For each reference pathogen the treatment train must:
  - Be validated to provide the LRV - 20 log for enteric virus, 14 log for Giardia cysts, and 15 log for Cryptosporidium oocysts
    - The redundant capacity
  - Include at least 4 pathogen barriers providing 1 to 6-log reduction
    - Ensures multi-barrier treatment
  - Include at least 3 treatment mechanisms (physical separation, chemical disinfection, and UV disinfection)
    - Ensures diverse processes

# Pathogen Treatment Validation

- Validate treatment processes and trains
- Determine the LRV a treatment will achieve most of the time (5th percentile LRV)
- Correlate performance with a measurable parameter and identify limits indicating failure



# Validation Procedure

## §64669.45(a)(3-4)

- Identify the mechanism(s) of pathogen reduction by process
- Identify the pathogens addressed or appropriate surrogates for pathogens for validation study
- Identify influencing factors that affect efficacy of process
- Describe method to collect and analyze the data
- The lower 5<sup>th</sup> percentile LRV demonstrated is the LRV credited for process
- Determine the critical limit(s)

# Validation Procedure

## §64669.45(a)(5&6)

- The treatment train LRV for enteric virus, Giardia, and Cryptosporidium is the sum of the treatment process validated 5th percentile LRVs for each pathogen.
- The treatment train must include UV disinfection with a dose of at least 300 mJ per cm<sup>2</sup>.



# Validation Opportunities

- The treatment required for CEC removal (O3/BAC – RO – AOP) can be validated for pathogen reduction and used to meet the bulk of the required LRVs
- Features of a raw water augmentation project, such as transport time and the “drinking water treatment plant” can be validated for pathogen LRVs

# Treatment Operation and Monitoring

## §64669.45(b)

- The treatment train must be operated continuously to achieve LRVs of 20, 14, and 15 for virus, Giardia, and Cryptosporidium respectively.
- The treatment LRVs provided must be tracked continuously with a SCADA system using on-line monitoring as determined in the validation.

# Pathogen Treatment Operation Limits

## § 64669.45 (b) (2-5)

- Discontinue delivery of water to the distribution system if the treatment train is not achieving LRVs of 16/10/11 for virus, Giardia, and Cryptosporidium respectively
- Discontinue delivery if the minimum # of treatment processes or treatment mechanisms are not provided.
- Discontinue delivery within 24 hours if the treatment train is not achieving minimum design LRVs of 20/14/15.

# Pathogen Treatment Monitoring & Control

## §64669.45(b)(1 & 6-8)

- Treatment LRVs must be tracked continuously with a SCADA system utilizing on-line monitoring for each process that was validated
- Control system must have associated alarms that indicate when the process is not operating as designed
- Control system must be designed to identify a failure of a process to meet its critical limit
- Control system must be designed to automatically stop the flow of inadequately treated water to the drinking water system before unsafe water reaches the system
- Notify the SWB when delivery of water must be halted

# Operations Plan

## §64669.80

- Describe how the SCADA system identifies LR treatment performance status and failures
- Describe how the SCADA system identifies a failure to meet the required log reduction and be able to automatically prevent water from reaching the distribution system

# Pathogen... Control Point Monitoring and Response Plan - \$64669.85

- For failure to provide 16/10/11 log reduction of virus, Giardia, and Cryptosporidium - SCADA must identify the failure conditions, alert the operator, halt the distribution of water, and generate a record of the incident
- A pathogen control point parameter not meeting the critical limit means that process is not allowed the validated LRV
- Response times (j & k) – total time required from a CCP failure to the termination of flow to the distribution system must be provided by the subsequent flow path

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Questions?