Article 21 water is by definition interruptible water; indeed, the word “interruptible” replaces the formerly used “surplus” in the Monterey Amendments. It should not be used as the basis for uninterruptible demands. Yet in chapter 6 of the Draft Reliability Report, local agencies are encouraged to include Article 21 water in a table of average annual values.

As DWR is aware, water supplies accounted for in the Urban Water Management Plans become the basis for approval of water supply assessments for new development in California. It is not only imprudent, but would provide institutional cover for unreliable planning, to recommend that local decision-makers approve housing that will be dependent on water that is ‘interruptible.’

Article 21 water should be removed from the recommended table of average annual deliveries.

**Use of CalSim-II as the sole tool to determine reliability is inappropriate given the following significant and yet to be resolved deficiencies**

The lack of calibration and other deficiencies of CalSim-II have been made known by the DWR in formal comments on the 2002 Draft by several parties, specifically Arve Sjovold and Dennis O’Conner. In addition, a 2003 expert peer review report documented numerous problems in CalSim II, and concluded that its predictions should be treated as “hypotheses.” A. Close et al., A Strategic Review of CalSim II and its User for Water Planning, Management and Operations in California 13 (2003). This Draft has not adequately addressed those deficiencies. Some of these previously-highlighted deficiencies are listed below.

- CalSim-II has not been calibrated or validated
- It is unclear whether CalSim-II incorporates limitations to groundwater use in the Sacramento Valley
- The CalSim-II model should not be used to make absolute predictions, such as those incorporated into the Reliability Report
- CalSim-II does not recognize or report uncertainty

Additionally, CalSim-II may produce results not consistent with reality, replacing the problem of paper water with an even greater problem of ‘cyber water.’ For example, in 2001, California experienced water supply associated with approximately the 75% exceedence level, and the State Water Project was able to deliver 1,607,570 ac-ft. However, the CalSim-II simulations predicted a 75% exceedence level of supply of roughly 2,500,000 ac-ft (as read from Figure 5.1). In other words, CalSim-II overpredicted deliveries by more than 50%. These discrepancies demonstrate the need to use multiple tools to determine reliability, as well as the need to articulate limitations of this particular model. Similarly, they demonstrate that local agencies will take enormous risks if they approve projects in reliance on CalSim II’s predictions that future deliveries will be substantially higher than historic deliveries.