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On behalf Of Petitioners, JENSEN FAMILY FARMS, INC., AND WILLIAM ELLIOTT, Respectively

CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD

In re: Matter of the Petitions of Ocean Mist

Farms and RC Farms, Grower-Shipper

Association of California, et al., Farm

Bureau, et al.,

SWRCB/OCC FILE A-2209 (a – e)

COMMENTS OF PETITIONERS JENSEN FAMILY FARMS, INC. AND AND WILLIAM ELLIOTT (SWRCB/OCC FILE 1-2209 (e) TO A-2209(a)-(e) AND PROPOSED ORDER WQ 2013-

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I. Introduction

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A proposed order draft has been prepared for the State Water Resources Control Board ("State Board") relative to various of the Petitions filed challenging the Conditional Waiver of Waste Discharge Requirements ("Ag Waiver") adopted by the Central Coast Regional Water Control Board ("Regional Board"). In great part, however, that proposed order either ignores or misconstrues the arguments raised in the petitions that establish the Ag Waiver's overall illegality and unconstitutionality as well as its lack of wisdom and practicality. When it does address the merits of some (but assuredly not all or even a majority) of those arguments, the result is an occasional modification which "tweaks" some of the Ag Waiver's more blatantly unsupported or illegal terms but otherwise leaves untouched the Ag Waiver's fundamental flaws and illegalities. The proposed order thus neither goes far enough nor makes sufficiently core program changes so that the Ag Waiver takes on a form that can withstand judicial challenge should the State Board, as it likely will do, substantially adopt the order as proposed. This is further exacerbated by the Proposed Order's paucity of references to and evidentiary citations to the Administrative Record when this Board can only base its decision on the law and evidentiary matters contained in the Administrative Record. In other words, the proposed order fails to provide a vehicle by which the State Board may fulfill its statutory obligations to protect the waters of California. Instead, by failing to make necessary program changes and to clean up the dubious procedures underlying the Regional Board's adoption of the Ag Waiver, the State Board merely continues down a path that will lead to further delay in making purer water a reality in the Central Coast Region.

The arguments made in the concurrently filed comments of the California Farm Bureau Federation, Ocean Mist Farms and RC Farms, and the Grower-Shipper Association regarding

Regional Board Order No. R-3-20112-0011, in combination with those raised here, establish the Ag Waiver -- even if the proposed order was adopted -- remains inappropriate, improper, illegal, exceeds the statutory authority of the Regional Board and State Board, and otherwise violates the due process and equal protection rights of Petitioners and similarly situated agricultural entities and persons.¹ The reasons for this are, at a minimum:

- 1. Illegal and unauthorized <u>ex parte</u> communications originating with Steven Shimek, an advocate for adoption of a stringent draconian Ag Waiver and spokesman for the Monterey Coastkeepers/The Otter Project were made through Regional Board Executive Officer Roger Briggs acting as a conduit for Mr. Shimek to members of the Regional Board concerning, among other things, the language of specific amendments Regional Board Member Michael Johnston ("Johnston") offered and the Regional Board adopted. Due to the timing of the amendments and <u>ex parte</u> nature of the communications leading to their preparation, the public and interested persons were denied input and discussion prior to the adoption of such matters;
- 2. The Regional Board failed and the proposed order does not correct to comply with the requirements of the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, Cal. Water Code § 13000 et seq., and specifically § 13241 thereof, by failing to conduct the requisite study and consideration of economic factors impacting the Central Reason prior to adoption of the Ag Waiver. Indeed, the reason offered for the failure e.g., that since the Regional Board is precluded, by the terms of Water Code § 13360, from dictating the means by which agriculture is to meet the compliance goals it cannot make economic evaluations of the impact of the use/cost of such compliance means is makeweight, unsupportable, and post-textual since the Ag Waiver itself dictates at least one means of compliance (the 30-foot buffer zone), the obvious economic impacts of which are easily, albeit minimally, possible of quantification and discussion since it involves the loss of thousands of acres of presently farmed agricultural land;
- 3. The 3-Tier categorization regime that is the centerpiece and operative linchpin of the Ag Waiver and its requisite operative feature, even as amended by the

We adopt and incorporate by reference as though set forth herein, the arguments and evidence offered by Petitioners Grower-Shippers Association et al., California Farm Bureau, and Ocean Mist Farms/RC Farms except insofar as they may be inconsistent with the arguments and evidence contained herein.

proposed order, violates the constitutionally protected due process and equal protection to those made subject to its terms by, among other things: (a) failing to factor into the definition of which operations go into Tier 1 (for instance) the levels of sedimentation and turbidity contained in run-off or other waters leaving the specific farm or agricultural operation which would more properly make it a Tier 2 farm/operation; (b) failing to take into consideration and definition for placement in a specific tier the geology of the soil and subsoil strata of individual farms or operations as well as the mechanisms for return of water used for irrigation to the aquifer or surface bodies of water specifically obtaining to that farm; (c) by exceeding the Regional Board's statutory authority under the Porter-Cologne Act so that the Ag Waiver deals with, among other things, groundwater;

- 4. The Ag Waiver insofar as it mandates a minimum 30-foot buffer zone relative to impaired bodies of water violates the constitutional rights of persons/entities subject to its terms in that: (a) it fails to specify the initial point of measurement for the 30-foot zone (for instance, whether the zone begins at the bank of the water body, or its middle, or mean high tide/flow level just to name a few) and is thus vague, ambiguous, overinclusive and overbroad to a degree that it violates due process; and (b) it affects a "regulatory" or other taking of real property for which the State Board, the Regional Board, or the State of California is liable for payment;
- 5. The Ag Waiver failed to adequately comply with the requirements of California's Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") and its implementing regulations by determining that only a negative declaration was needed, thereby failing to accurately or adequately assess and consider the significant impacts of the Ag Waiver on the environment as a whole.

Consideration by the State Board of the Ag Waiver, the Petitions of the agricultural or agriculturally-aligned parties, and the Proposed Order at and after the July 23, 2013 workshop should result in a granting, in whole or in substantial part, of the Petitions and negation of the Ag Waiver. The proposed order refers to the prior actions of this Board in creating an "expert panel" that will study the nature and causes of nitrate pollution as well as the best means for dealing with it relative to a recent study done by the University of California at Davis. See Proposed Order at p. 2 n. 2. That "expert panel" must be allowed to complete its work and make its recommendations that will hopefully inform the creation of an effective and legal Ag Waiver

regime by the Regional Board and also provide a conforming operative template to be used throughout the State by other Regional Board's having jurisdiction over agricultural lands. Taking any amendatory action relative to the present Ag Waiver that will allow its present implementation and operation pending the outcome of the Expert Panel is quite simply putting the proverbial cart before the proverbial horse. This is particularly so since, as established by reference to the Administrative Record of the present Ag Waiver, that Waiver is based not on reliable scientific evidence but, rather, on generalizations and assumptions not tied to the reality of conditions in the Central Coast Region as well as unsupportable anecdotal "evidence."

In reaching this conclusion it is important to realize and accept the reality – rather than just giving it lip-service — that the vast majority of the members of the agricultural sector of the Central Coast Region's economy do not intentionally "foul their own nests" by polluting their drinking wells or sources of irrigation water. Rather (and this is something that, at most, the Regional Board only afforded lip service), they believe in the necessity of water purification, in ending the abuse of a few of their numbers who do over- and wrongly-use pesticides and fertilizers, and in nurturing the land and environment in and on which they live and from which they earn their livings. They further believe that these matters must be done responsibly and through a workable partnership between the industry and California's administrative bodies charged with protection of the Region's water resources. The Ag Waiver most assuredly was neither created under nor reflects that workable partnership. In fact, the harsh light of day reveals that it is not the most — or anywhere near the best — means by which water purification can be responsibly accomplished with the least amount of overall negative impact on the environment of the Region as a whole.

II. Argument²

A. Adoption Of The Ag Waiver Was Tainted By The Presence Of Illegal And Proscribed Ex Parte Communications Which Resulted In The Violation Of Petitioner's Constitutional Right To Due Process

The relatively unique structure and operative scheme for the conduct of public meetings of the Regional Board should have – but most assuredly did not – make it more sensitive to the public and constitutional concerns that preclude ex parte communications between advocates or interested parties relative to the Ag Waiver and members of the Regional Board.³ Unlike the incorrect characterizations of all the Petitioner's positions upon which the Proposed Order is based, we do not complain that proscribed ex parte communications, without involvement by a third party advocate, necessarily existed between Regional Board Executive Officer Roger Briggs and Regional Boardmember Michael Johnston. Of course, Mr. Briggs (or his successor as Executive Officer) may have contacts with the Board members concerning the matters under discussion in order to provide them with advice or guidance. But the matters of which we complain are different. First, the communications between Messrs. Johnston and Briggs concerned draft language that had been worked on prior to the close of the public

The factual background of the Ag Waiver and the State Board's prior consideration thereof relative to the requests for a stay made by several of the agricultural petitioners is fully set forth in the proposed order and need not be repeated here. In these regards, the facts but not the factual shading are incorporated herein.

One of the troubling practices of the Regional Board – and certainly not one which the State Board practices or allows relative to its own meetings – is who is seated with the board members on the members panel. Unlike the practice of any other State, county, or municipal board with which we are personally familiar or have any anecdotal evidence, the Executive Officer as well as the Board's attorney sit among and are interspersed between members of the Regional Board during the meetings leading up to and including the meeting at which the Ag Waiver was adopted. Indeed, the Executive Officer and attorney often engage in off-the-record sub voce conferences with Board members during meetings. Since the appearance of propriety and fairness is often more important to the public than its actual existence, these matters appear to create a fertile ground from which ex parte communications may arise and are sources of suspicion by the public as to how the Board reaches its decisions.

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participation section of the meeting but which, frankly and obviously, was purposefully withheld from specific discussion during the public discussion section and mentioned only after that section had closed. Second and separately, the initiating presence of a third party – Steven Shimek, the representative of the Monterey Coastkeepers/The Otter Project, and advocate for a draconian ag waiver program – changes the dynamic of the Briggs-Johnston communications and the fact that Mr. Briggs acted as a conduit between Mr. Shimek and Board member Johnston informs an illegal ex parte communication and resultant violation of Petitioner's due process rights. After all, it cannot be denied that such an "ex parte" conduit situation is proscribed under California law regardless of the context. As the California Supreme Court held in Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control ex rel. Quintinar v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. ("Ouintinar") (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 10 n. 8:

"Each form on contact [such as between a prosecutor and a final agency decision maker on the one hand and those between a prosecutor and the decision maker's adviser, on the other hand equally compromises the protection that the APA's adjudicative bill of right sought to adopt: nothing in the APA contemplates permitting an agency to accomplish through secondhand communications what is forbidden through firsthand communications." (Emphasis supplied)

This both reflects and is grounded on the "fairness principle" which

"directs that in adjudicative matters, one adversary should not be permitted to bend the ear of the ultimate decision maker or the decision maker's advisers in private."

Chevron Stations, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 116. 125 (quoting Quintinar, 40 cal.4th at p. 5).

The State Board Staff's proposed order, however, poo-poos not only the existence of ex parte communications but also the effect those communications had on the Regional Board's final Ag Waiver, including amendments thereto adopted by the Regional Board and offered by

the entire Briggs-Johnston communication was illegal and constitutionally infirm since Briggs

It should be noted that both Mr. Shimek and Mr. Briggs qualify as "advocates" to whom the <u>ex parte</u> statutes and State Board rules apply. As noted in <u>Quintinar</u>, 40 Cal.4th at 12, "By definition, an advocate is a partisan for a particular point of view..." Mr. Shimek was thus an advocate for Monterey Coastkeepers and Mr. Briggs was surely an advocate for the Ag Waiver proposed by his own Staff. <u>See also Rondon v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.</u> (2007) 1512 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1284 n. 2, quoting Govt. Code § 11430(10) ("While the proceeding is pending there shall be no communication, direct or indirect, regarding any issue in the proceeding, to the presiding officer [which includes Johnston as a member of the Regional Board] from an interested person outside the agency, without notice and opportunity for all parties to participate in the communications.") To deny that Mr. Briggs was an advocate defies common sense, ignores the role he played, and is sheer sophistry. To deny that Mr. Shimek is an advocate is just plain wrong.

acted as an undisclosed conduit of third-party Shimek's suggestions to the Board which led to consideration of those suggestions by the Board **after** the public session had closed.

The true facts relating to those communications are simply stated. The Regional Board's hearing which resulted in the Ag Waiver's adoption was held on March 14 and 15, 2012. While March 14 was spent in presentations of their respective positions by members of the public as well as of the agricultural community, limited rebuttal was presented on March 15 from the agricultural community, the Regional Board's staff, and in deliberations by the Regional Board once the public participation aspect of the meeting had closed. Only at this point where public participation ended was an amendment offered by Mr. Johnston that, by his own admission, had been **earlier** prepared by Mr. Johnston in conjunction with Mr. Briggs and Ms. McChesney (attorney for the Board):

"I gather you are aware, Mr. Chairman, because it was shared with you, although none of the other members, is **I worked with the Executive Officer and counsel over the last week or two on a couple of different pieces of language.** And the principal stuff in there is – well, three things really."

March 15, 2012 Transcript 94:5-11 (emphasis supplied). During the discussion of that amendatory language (the "Johnston Proposal"), the following was stated:

"MR. YOUNG: I think it is a great proposal. I think want you've done is taken what Staff has always said was achievable as part of what they have been proposing, and essentially put down in writing what it might look like, and make that part of what we're going to incorporate in the Order and the Monitoring Program. So how much of this did you write?

MR. JOHNSTON: About half.

MR. JOHNSTON: In answer to your question about what I wrote, this was a back and forth between myself, Roger [Briggs], Frances [McChesney]. And I would imagine that Roger was consulting other Staff on it. ... MR. YOUNG: ... Is this acceptable to Staff [sic]?⁵]

[&]quot;Is this acceptable to Staff" is a most revealing question since it strikes directly at the absence of meaningful independence of the Board in fulfilling its statutory mandate. At no point does Porter-Cologne or other sections of the Water Code state that it is for the Staff to decide

MR. BRIGGS: That was the reason Mr. Johnston wanted to vet it instead of dropping it here was to see if it would be acceptable [to the Staff]." (Emphasis supplied)

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Evidence obtained after March 15 and presented as Exhibit G to the Petition of the Grower-Shipper Assoc. Central California, et al, establish the proscribed communications.⁶ The evidence⁷ is irrefutable. The Regional Board Staff (specifically Lisa McCann and Mr. Briggs) received communications from Steven Shimek regarding meeting that he had with the State Water Board and California Environmental Protection Agency ("CalEPA") Undersecretary Gordon Burn and others (including Rick Tomlinson of the Grower-Shippers Association) with

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what is acceptable to it in the setting of policy and that such acceptability is the overarching element that must or even should be considered by the Regional Board. The Regional Board was never meant to be a "rubber stamp" for its, at least theoretically, subservient staff or allow the Staff's view of what is necessary to protect against water pollution automatically be the Regional Board's. See, e.g.. Water Code §§ 13201 (delineating, with specificity, the qualifications of each representative board member), 13223 (a) (providing broad power for the board to delegate any of its powers and duties to its "executive officer" except the powers relating to "the issuance, modification, or revocation of any water quality control plan, water quality objectives, or waste discharge requirement"), 13225 (delineating duties of the board without reference to its Staff being the driving force as to the setting of policy). One can but wonder what would have happened had the answer to the question been "no."

That evidence of the ex parte communications – while not physically included in the

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17 Administrative Record – may nonetheless be considered by the State Board. As the Supreme 18 Court stated in Quintinar, 40 Cal. 4th at pp. 15-16 n. 11:

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"The Department urges that ex parte contacts are not in the record (a virtual tautology) and thus the Board cannot consider them or direct that they be added to the record, whether or not the Department has considered them; if this is so, then the Department may violate the APA without sanction. To read this as the Department does, as further precluding inquiry into ex parte communications, would render the APA as it applies to the Department, and the Board's constitutional authority to assure compliance a dead letter. We reject such a seemingly absurd result."

As used in the exparte context, "evidence" in terms of proving the existence of proscribed communications must be afforded an expansive meaning and coverage. See, e.g., Matthew Zaheri Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1997) 55 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1317.

regard to what is known as the "Shimek proposal." (That proposal is quoted in length and compared to the Briggs-Johnston amendment below.) See, e.g., Exhibit G, including Roger Briggs telephone conversation notes -- (a) "tc Shimek ... Steve took draft to Sacto..."); (b) "Steve Shimek ... Here @ Wed. Would like to meet only w/ people re. supplemental"; (c) "Steve Shimek – getting calls, wanted to be sure I'm OK" – and Ms. McCann's telephone conversation notes 3/8/12 ("Shimek re conversation /w Rick Tomlinson [and] Gordon Burns." So too did the Regional Board Staff have the actual Shimek Proposal presented by him to CalEPA as well as meet with Mr. Shimek concerning it. See Exhibit G (Declaration of Rick Tomlinson).

With these as a baseline, e-mails between Mr. Johnston and Mr. Briggs establish that Executive Officer Briggs provided edits to Mr. Johnston for the Ag Waiver, and provided Mr. Johnston with a final version – with edits in red to identify the new language added by Briggs to the Johnston proposal as submitted to the Staff – after Ms. McChesney had the opportunity to review them. Exhibit G at pp. 22-24. Part of the red highlighted edits includes New Condition 11 (which is what the Johnston amendment was directed at) and which, in turn, is essentially the Shimek proposal. See Exhibit G pp. 15, 17 (March 10, 2012 e-mail from Briggs to Johnston – "Mike, Here are possible edit for the order (two docs here)"); March 12, 2012 e-,ail from Johnston to Briggs requesting that copies of the language be left at the hotel desk for Mr. Johnston who was checking in the hotel to attend the Regional Board meeting); March 13, 2012 e-mail from Briggs to Johnson conveying the final language of the Johnston proposal amendment and that copies would also be provided to Regional Board Chair Jeff Young). In other words, prior to the first day of the hearing (March 14) Mr. Johnston and Mr. Young had

Sadly, no copy of Mr. Johnston's proposed amendment as drafted by him and before it was coopted by Mr. Briggs to reflect Mr. Shimek's proposal is available in the Administrative Record.

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copies of the Johnston proposal adding Condition No. 11 to the Ag Waiver. However, neither the existence nor specifics of this Johnston proposal were mentioned to the public at the March 14 and 15, respectively, sessions of the Regional Board's meeting. That awaited the closing of the public comment session.

A side-by-side comparison of the Shimek Proposal and the Johnston Proposal (after being coopted by Mr. Briggs) reveals their striking similarity which, common sense dictates is not a matter of coincidence. Rather, it was a matter of design and intent. The Shimek Proposal is as follows:

"Inserted between Staff Proposal Condition 10 and 11:

Groups may form around watersheds or other commonalities to propose creative water quality projects and solutions, and to clarify group efforts which could lead to compliance with this order (i.e. commodity based certification programs such as SIP). At the discretion of the Executive officer, groups may be granted downclassifications (i.e. Tier 3 to Tier 2) and project-specific timelines, benchmarks, and monitoring requirements. The purpose of this provision is to encourage innovations, site-specific solutions, and to remove barriers to long-term investment (i.e. engineered wetlands).

Projects will be evaluated for, among other things:

- ♦ Scale. Solutions must be scaled to address impairment
- ♦ Chance of success. Projects must demonstrate a reasonable chance of eliminating toxicity within the permit term (5 years) and reducing discharge of nutrients to surface and groundwaters.
- Commitment to solving the problem. Proposals must address what new actions will be taken if the project does not meet goals and how the project will be sustained through time.
- Benchmarks and accountability. Proposals must set benchmarks and describe monitoring and measuring methods. Monitoring points must be at the point of discharge but may not always be at the edgeof-field, so long as monitoring results demonstrate water quality improvements and the efficacy of a project.

Project proposals will be evaluated by a committee comprised of [Two?] Three researchers or academics skilled in agricultural practices and/or water quality, one farm advisor (NRCS or RCD), one grower representative, one environmental representative, one environmental justice of environmental health representative, and one RWQCB staff member. The TWQCB Executive Officers has sole

discretion in giving final approval of any project after receiving project evaluation results and recommendations from the committee."

See Tomlinson Decl, Ex. I (Shimek Proposal). In comparison, the Johnston Proposal (after Mr.

Briggs was finished with it) stated:

"New Condition 11 (all new language):

Dischargers may form third party groups to develop and implement alternative water quality management practices (i.e. group projects) or cooperative monitoring and reporting programs to accompany with this order. At the discretion of the Executive Officer, Dischargers that are a participant in a third party group that implements Executive Officer-approved water quality improvement projects ore Executive Officer-approved alternative monitoring and reporting programs may be moved to a lower Tier (e.g., Tier 3 to Tier 2, Tier 2 to Tier 1) and/or provided alternative project-specific timelines and milestones.

To be subject to Tier changes or alternative timelines, Projects will be evaluated for, among other elements:

- ◆ Project description. Description must include identification of participants, methods, and time schedule for implementation.
- ◆ Purpose. Proposal must state desired outcomes or =goals of the project (e.g., pollutants to be addressed, amount of pollution load to be reduced, water quality improvements expected).
- ♦ Scale. Solutions must be scaled to address impairment.
- ♦ Chance of Success. Projects must demonstrate a reasonable chance of eliminating toxicity within the permit term (five years) or reducing discharge of nutrients to surface and groundwater.
- ♦ Long term solutions and contingencies. Proposals must address what new actions will be taken if the project does not meet goals and how the project will be sustained through time.
- ♦ Accountability. Proposals must set milestones that indicate progress towards goals stated as above in 'purpose.'
- ♦ Monitoring and reporting. Description of monitoring and measuring methods, and information to be provided to the Water Board. Monitoring points must be representative but may not always be at the edge-of-farm so long as monitoring results demonstrate water quality improvement and the efficacy of a project. In addition monitoring must 1) characterize and be representative of discharge to receiving water, 2) demonstrate project effectiveness, 3) and verify progress towards water quality improvement and pollutant load reduction.

Project proposals will be evaluated by a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) comprised of: two researchers or academics stilled in agricultural practices and/or water quality, one farm advisor (NRSC or RCD), one grower representative, one

environmental representative, and one Regional Board Staff. The TAC must have a minimum of five members to evaluate project proposals and make recommendations to the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer has discretion to approve any project after receiving project evaluation results and recommendations from the committee. If the Executive Officer denies approval, the third party group may seek review by the Regional board. As stated in the NPS Policy, management practice implementation is not a substitute for compliance with water quality requirements. If the project is not effective in achieving water quality standards, additional management practices by individual Dischargers or the third party group will be necessary."

<u>Id.</u>, Exhibit G pp. 22-23, 14-15.

Discounting the perpetuating phenomena described in Ecclesiastes I, Chap. 1, vs. 9-10, 9 the similarities between the Shimek Proposal and the Johnston Proposal cannot be seen as being coincidental. That is, both set forth a very similar process for third party groups, they both allow for the lowering of tier designation subject to Executive Officer approval, they both include almost the same exact elements for projects to be evaluated, and both require review by a Technical Advisory Committee that is composed of the identically-described individuals. Indeed, there is a marked verbatim overlap between the two. Under all of the circumstances these matters lend themselves to only one conclusion: Mr. Briggs acted as a conduit from Mr. Shimek to Mr. Johnston. That is both illegal and disserves the public interest that must served by all public employees and agencies.

Putting the best possible spin on these facts in favor of the Regional Board, Mr. Johnston prior to March 2013 was trying to formulate what he considered to be a possible amendment to the Ag Waiver. The reality, however, cannot be spun. Mr. Briggs "assisted" him by providing

Ecclesiastes I, ch. 1, vs. 9-10 (King James Version, 2000), state:

[&]quot;The things that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is nothing new under heaven. Is there anything whereof may it be said, so, this is new, it hath been already of old time, which was before us."

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him with the Shimek Proposal (the product of a person clearly interested in the outcome of the proceeding). Mr. Shimek – realistically presuming the lack of altruism on his part – supplied the language of his proposal to Mr. Briggs in the hope and expectation that it would somehow find its way into the final Ag Waiver. That was done outside the presence and with no notice to the other parties such as Petitioners or the public generally. The procedure used, in fact, deprived them and us of the ability to confront and discuss the Johnston proposal. What is even stranger and leads inexorably to the conclusion that proscribed ex parte communications from Mr. Shimek through Mr. Briggs to Mr. Johnston were involved is the fact that Mr. Shimek could easily have presented his Proposal as a part of his numerous public appearances before the Regional Board – including notably his 24-minute presentation of March 13, 2012 -- but mysteriously chose not to do so. That way, no public comment on his proposal was to be elicited or allowed. Rather than use the public front door, they used the private back door. Just as obviously, Mr. Johnston or Mr. Briggs or the Regional Board or the Staff of the Regional Board could have presented that proposal during the public comment section so that it could be vetted by the public and the agricultural industry that were ultimately subjected to its terms. That it was not violated the law and the due process rights of Petitioners and other similarly situated persons.

The result of all of this is, as argued for by numerous Petitioners, the violation of the due process rights and liberty interests of persons subject to the 2012 Proposal. After all, due process is preserved only where "rules prohibiting ex parte communications are preserved." Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water resources Control Bd. (45 Cal.4th 731, 741. It is, however, violated when a basic fairness principle attaching to adjudicative hearings is not met: "One fairness principle directs that in adjudicative matters, one adversary should not be permitted to bend the ear of the ultimate decision maker or the decision maker's adviser's in

private." Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Appeal Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 4-5. When ex parte communications of the type involved here occur under the irrefutable circumstances present in this case, the due process right to a fair hearing under both the federal and California due process clauses occurs. U.S. Const. 14 Amend., Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a). This is so since

"Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments."

<u>Mathews v. Eldridge</u> (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 332. Indeed, as held in <u>Withrow v. Larkin</u> (1975) 421 U.S. 35, 46-47:

"A 'fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts." (Internal citations omitted)

No question then exists that Petitioners have a property interest of which they are deprived when due process is not afforded them due to <u>ex parte</u> communications in the Regional Board's adjudicatory quasi-judicial proceeding. The proposed order does not discuss, refute or even deal with these legal conclusions and their obvious controlling application here.

It violates due process for the Regional Board to conduct a hearing in which <u>ex parte</u> communications are made to the decision maker, such communications are not made known to the parties involved, and, importantly, when a decision is made in which it reveals the undisclosed communications (evidence) for the first time. <u>See English v. City of Long Beach</u> (1950) 35 Cal.2d 155, 158, where the California Supreme Court held that when "information [is] received without the knowledge of the parties and at a time and place other than that appointed for the hearing," and "the board secretly obtains information and bases its determination

thereon," the parties affected are denied a fair hearing. <u>Id.</u> at p. 159. The denial of that fair hearing is a denial of due process. ¹⁰

The proposed order seems to indicate that even if proscribed ex parte communications and resulting due process violations did exist here they have no effect since the proposed order suggests that certain changes be made in the Johnston Proposal (Condition 11), which changes would be subject to public discussion. Without mentioning the term, it thus appears that the proposed order assumes that this post-adoption public discussion moots the underlying violation. That is wrong as a matter of law. An apt analogy to the situation existing here is to changes having been made to a regulatory program while an underlying decision is on appeal and the settled law that such changes neither moot out the appeal nor mitigate the underlying constitutional deprivations. The continued existence of proscribed conduitical ex parte

"Our decisions have recognized that statutes ordinarily are interpreted as operating prospectively in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary legislative intent. In construing statutes, there is a presumption against retroactive application unless the Legislature plainly has directed otherwise by means of "express language of retroactivity or ... other sources [that] provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the legislature intended retroactive application." Ambiguous statutory language will not suffice to dispel the presumption against retroactivity; rather "a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed ... to be unambiguously prospective." (Internal citations omitted, italic in original).

Before proceeding to a discussion of these various points it should be noted that we are mindful of the recent enactment by the Legislature of amendments to Water Code § 13287(a) dealing with ex parte communications with the Regional Water Board and this Board concerning adjudicatory proceedings such as the one that led to the enactment of the 2012 Conditional Waiver. That section plays no role here due to its not having been made retroactive by the legislature. See, e.g., Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, where the California Supreme Court recently reviewed and described California's rules for determining whether a statutory amendment is to be afforded a prospective and/or retroactive affect:

<u>See also People v. Brown</u> (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319-322; <u>Mateo v. Department of Motor Vehicles</u> (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 624, 632-34.

communications of the type involved here is obviously a matter of great importance and, in fact, are not specifically dealt with in the the latest statute dealing with communications to a water board (Water Code § 13287). When this type of situation exists, mootness does not occur. See, e.g., Doe v. Wilson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 296, 304 (question of validity of emergency regulations and due process violations was not moot even though the State was promulgating replacement regulations on a non-emergency basis); Save Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 141, 146 (public interest in the underlying question defeats mootness).

So, what should the Board do in light of the obvious violations by the Regional Board (particularly Messr. Johnston and Young) of the rules, statutes, and precedents concerning exparte communications. There really is one remedy: i.e., reversal of the Regional Board's Order. The California Supreme Court ordered such a remedy in Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 40 Cal.4th at p. 17:

"The APA's administrative adjudication bill of rights was designed to eliminate such one-sided occurrences. We will not countenance them here. Thus, reversal of the Department's orders is required."

Accord Rondon v. Alcoholic Beverage Appeals Bd. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1290, where in relying on Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 40 Cal.4th at p. 17, the Court concluded that reversal of the administrative bodies' order was required:

"As long-standing California Supreme Court precedent teaches: "Administrative tribunals which are required to make a determination after a hearing cannot act upon their own information, and nothing can be considered as evidence that was not introduced at a hearing of which the parties had notice or at which they were present. [Citations.] The fact that there may be substantial and properly introduced evidence which supports the board's ruling is immaterial." (*English v. City of Long Beach, supra, 35 Cal.2d at pp. 158-159.*) "A contrary conclusion would be tantamount to requiring a hearing in form but not in substance, for the right of a hearing before an administrative tribunal would be meaningless if the

tribunal were permitted to base its determination upon information received

without the knowledge of the parties." [¶] In this case, based on the violation of statutory protections designed to ensure due process and a fair hearing, we conclude that "reversal of the Department's orders is required." (Internal citations omitted)

Reversal of the Regional Board's Ag Waiver is thus the only remedy available and sufficient to meet the Regional Board's violation of the law, rules, and precedent regarding exparte communications. That the violation of those matters may have been the result of innocent earnestness on the part of the then-newly appointed member Mr. Johnston is of no moment to the existence of the violation since motive or intent is not an element when it comes to the use of exparte communications. Indeed, even if the opposite were true Mr. Johnson's perhaps-innocent-earnestness is overcome by the actions of the other involved individuals – all of whom knew better – involved in the exparte communications.

B. The Ag Waiver Order Is Illegal And The Proposed Order Is Wrong Since The Regional Board Failed To Comply With The Requirements Of Water Code § 13241 By Its Pre-Adoption Failure To Consider, Among Other Things, Various Economic Considerations Relating To The Impact Of The Order

In formulating and issuing the Ag Waiver, the Regional Board failed to comply with Cal. Water Code § 13241, a key provision of the Porter-Cologne Water Act, and thus acted in derogation of the limits on its authority. Resultantly, the Regional Board violated the due process rights of the entities and persons bound by the terms of the Ag Waiver. The Proposed Order, finding no evidence in the Administrative Record to the contrary, merely assumes a "so what – sure it did" attitude which, frankly, denigrates the statutory requirement and evidences an intent to validate the Ag Waiver come hell or high (but hopefully purified) water.

Section 13241 is a key provision of the Porter-Cologne statutory regime since it defines the duties of the regional boards when considering adoption of such things as the Ag Waiver. In pertinent part, it provides:

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"Each regional board shall establish such water quality objectives in water quality control plans as in its judgment will ensure the reasonable protection of beneficial uses and the prevention of nuisance; however, it is recognized that it may be possible for the quality of water to be changed to some degree without unreasonably affecting beneficial uses. Factors to be considered by a regional board in establishing water quality objectives shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, all of the following: ...

- (d) Economic considerations.
- (e) The need for developing housing within the region.
- (f) The need to develop and use recycled water."

(Emphasis supplied). The import of this provision is obvious. When promulgating the terms of the Ag Waiver and deciding that agricultural, nursery, and viticulture growers are to be bound by various of its respective terms, Section 13241 mandates the Regional Board engage in a balancing process that necessarily factors in such things as "economic considerations" and "developing housing" when determining what conditions and restrictions are needed to serve those interests and, at the same time, not unreasonably impacting beneficial uses of water. Such a balancing is mandatory: i.e., pursuant to established rules of statutory interpretation and practice, the use of the word "shall" in the statute imposes an affirmative and mandatory duty on the Regional Board to consider and comply with the designated factors before and when adopting the Ag Waiver. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443 ("shall" is normally construed as a mandatory term in statutes); Morris v. City of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 904 ("shall" imposes a mandatory duty); Coalition for Clean Air v. City of Visalia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 408, 423 ("'shall' identifies a mandatory element which all public agencies are required to follow..."); In re Anthony T. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1019 ("The term 'shall' is used to express a command. (Webster's New Internation. Dict. (2002) p. 2085 col. 1 ["shall' is mandatory"]). "Shall" in this context is a mandatory and thus creates a mandatory duty with which the Regional Board must comply or else be found to have violated

the requirements of the statute. The Regional Board did not comply with that mandatory duty and thus doomed that Waiver.

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Indeed, a review of the Conditional Waiver and Order as well as its accompanying Record reveals that the Regional Board did not adequately – and, indeed, at all -- address these matters (other than, of course, the "need to develop and use recycled water" since such water is a key element and sine qua non of the Ag Waiver). This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the Record establishes that the Regional Board refused to even consider economic considerations and impact (as well as the impact and effect on developing housing) of the then-proposed waiver in any context (including that of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) analysis in which it refused to consider "economic" factors due to its view that they were not relevant even when they may have a direct relationship to environmental effects). It is also borne out by the need for the Record to affirmatively contain even facially accurate evidence of what the specific factors/evidence considered are as well as that such considerations were actually considered. Neither Section 13241 nor precedent permit the Board to merely assume they do not exist or, for that matter, fail to identify them and elucidate what impact they have on the decision to issue and formulate the Ag Waiver. Further, even if it is assumed that members of the Regional Board have personal knowledge or beliefs concerning the economic factors involved arising from their life experience or prior dealings of the Regional Board (including consideration and adoption of the Ag Waiver), such knowledge does not provide a basis for statutory compliance in the present context.11 The simple reason for that is that such knowledge is not identified and is not a part of

Indeed, it defies common sense that any consideration of economic factors that may have been made relative to adoption of the 2004 Conditional Waiver could or should or would be attributed to the 2012 Conditional Waiver. After all, economic conditions as they existed in 2003-2004 are most certainly not the same or similar conditions to that which exist in 2011-2012 due to the vast economic upheavals that have occurred during the intervening 8 years as well as the broad expansion of the conditional waiver in 2012. A review of the record here, however,

the record here and thus cannot be used to "fill in the blanks" of the Order and record themselves.

Since the record is bare of any evidence of the economic considerations that Section 13241 mandates be made (with the possible exception of a nonsensical estimate that the 30-foot buffer would cause the loss of less than 100 acres of farmland out of the 400,000 plus acres under tillage in the Region forwarded by Ms. McCann of the Regional Board Staff) and which were made by the Regional Board prior to adoption of the Order, it must be assumed that such matters were not considered. Indeed, notably missing from the proposed order are Administrative Record citations establishing the requisite consideration. That failure in and of itself, and without more, renders the Order invalid and illegal. The result of this is a patent violation of the statutory basis for the Board taking any action at all concerning adoption of the Ag Waiver. That negatively impacts the legality of the Board's actions as a whole since it renders its Order categorically arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious. Resultantly, the adopted Ag Waiver (and with it any validation by this Board) violates the due process rights of all persons and entities made subject to its terms and conditions.

The Regional Board may, of course, have the untoward belief that its failure to set forth these considerations in the Record and in the Waiver Order itself is rendered nugatory by three matters: <u>i.e.</u>,

- 1. The Board members themselves had some form of personal knowledge of such matters (including that such considerations did not militate against adoption of the Order) that informed their votes adopting the Ag Waiver;
- 2. Such knowledge and that they considered in it prior to (and as a part of the bases for passing the Waiver) does not need to be stated in the record; and,

does not even establish that such economic considerations and Section 13241's mandate were considered, factored in to, or otherwise complied with in issuing the 2004 Conditional Waiver.

3. Consideration of economic matters – although unstated in the record or in the Waiver Order itself – may be presumed from the adoption of the Order itself since the Board would not knowingly violate its own operative/authorizing statutes.

None of these three (or, for that matter, similar considerations) are of any moment and do not save the Waiver Order from its illegality and accompanying violation of due process rights. Clearly, such matters are not in the Record and the Record is otherwise bereft of evidence to back up the Ag Waiver Code § 13241. If such matters did inform the Ag Waiver, then our due process rights were violated. See English v. City of Long Beach (1950) 35 Cal.2d 155, 158:

"The action of such an administrative board exercising adjudicatory functions when based upon information of which the parties are not apprised and which they had no opportunity to controvert amounts to a denial of a hearing. Administrative tribunals which are required to make a determination after a hearing cannot act upon their own information, and nothing can be considered as evidence that was not introduced at a hearing of which the parties had notice or at which they were present."

When "information [is] received without the knowledge of the parties and at a time and place other than that appointed for the hearing," and "the board secretly obtains information and bases its determination thereon," the parties affected are denied a fair hearing. <u>Id.</u> at p. 159. Additionally,

"Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers which are required to make a determination after a hearing cannot act on their own information. Nothing may be treated as evidence which has not been introduced as such, inasmuch as a hearing requires that the party be apprised of the evidence against him in order that he may refute, test, and explain it."

<u>La Prada v. Department of Water & Power</u> (1945) 27 Cal.2d 47, 51-52. The denial of a fair hearing violates due process.

Since the burden and duty of introducing facts and evidence concerning, for instance, the existence or non-existence of economic considerations implicated by the Ag Waiver's terms lay with the proposed order and it fails to establish such matters, we are under no duty to establish

the existence of economic matters that must or should have been considered. Regardless of the absence of such a duty, however, various of the Petitioners (including the Grower Shipper Alliance, Ocean Mist Farms, the Farm Bureau, Jensen Farms and others) did produce ample evidence establishing the economic impact and considerations that should have been considered by the Regional Board but that were ignored by the Board, not made a part of the record as considerations considered by the Board, and thus played no part in the adoption of the Ag Waiver. Among these matters were:

- The loss of agricultural production that would arise from setting aside land required by the 30-foot buffer zone (a matter that conflicts with the California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement (see www.ccof.org/leafygreens) and the "super metrics" adopted by the California food production industry to address food safety concerns);
- 2. Relatedly, the 30-foot buffer zone will cause literally thousands of acres of farmland now under cultivation to cease being under cultivation. The direct economic impact of that is obvious and non-speculative: fewer crops will be grown resulting in fewer crops being sold and otherwise being made available to the public which lowers profits and the funds available for use by the owner/operator to "grow" the Region's economy. All of these are a surefire means of affecting economic stagnation in an industry which is now just about the only California industry successfully working its way out of the current recession and economic downturn;
- 3. The economic market place reaction to lower profits for the farmer is, of course, an increase by the farmer in the sale price of his produce, a matter that directly translates into higher food costs to the public (which, like higher gasoline costs)

further contributes to inflation and economic stagnation of the Region as well as California as a whole;

- 4. The decrease in farm land value that is the result of lowered production, a matter that will necessarily result in a significant decrease property taxes paid which, in turn, impacts the amounts of money available to local, county, and state governmental units (including this Board); and,
- 5. Just as a decrease in property taxes will result in further layoffs and furloughs of public employees, cutbacks in the number of laborers necessary to service the agricultural industry in the Region occasioned by having significantly fewer acres available for cultivation will occur. The results of that will obviously be a reduction in the monies being spent in the Region's economy, an increase in governmental benefits being paid to the unemployed, a movement of individuals out of the region, increased foreclosures of homes now being purchased by unemployed laborers, a decrease in housing being built or developed (due to a higher foreclosure-related inventory of housing being available in the market), and the resulting impact on the taxes that may be collected by the local and state governments. Indeed, a cascading detrimental economic effect and impact is likely to occur as a result of the Order.

Of obvious great interest and impact is the 30-foot buffer zone which the Ag Waiver dictates is a required means of compliance with the Waiver. This in spite of the command of Water Code § 13360:

"No waste discharge requirement or other order of a regional board or the state board or decree of a court ... shall specify the design, location, type of construction, or particularly manner in which compliance may be had with the requirements"

The Regional Board in ducking both its economic analysis and its obligations to conduct the requisite CEQA analysis (rather than just determine a negative declaration was all that was needed) used this section as a shield but, at the same time, used it as a sword against agriculture in ignoring it relative to, for instance, the 30-foot barrier as a means of compliance. Thus, regardless that reverse osmosis machines or evaporation pools – both of which are big, expensive, take land out of production, and require infrastructure construction – are the only two available means of meeting purification standards, the Regional Board said it could not tell anyone which one to use and, hence, could perform no economic analysis since the considerations obtaining to both or either were different. But it could tell them to put a 30-foot buffer, the economic impact of which is obvious and, at a minimum, should have been considered prior to adoption of the Waiver.

Taking the Salinas River as an example – but other rivers in the Region or other bodies of endangered waterbodies abound – the loss of agricultural land from imposition of the 30-foot barrier is staggering. The Salinas River is 170 miles in length, running from San Luis Obispo County through Monterey County and emptying into Monterey Bay. See Donald J. Funk, Upper Salinas River and Tributaries Watershed Fisheries Report, Upper Salinas Tablas Resource Conservation District (2002-2003). Discounting 50% of its length due to such things as housing/industrial developments abutting the river as well as things such as the River Road separating the river from adjacent farmland by more than 30 feet, that means that approximately 6000 acres of farmland will be lost to the buffer zone. How it can be reasonably stated that such a loss would not have the above-noted economic impacts, at a minimum, is unknown and unknowable.

These types of economic considerations were overlooked, ignored, and did not in any way factor into setting the terms of the Order or in consideration of its impact on the farming, viticulture, and nursery industries in the Region. See, e.g., City of Arcadia v. State Water Resource Control Bd. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1416-1418. That is a blatant violation of Section 13241 which, without more, requires rejection and reversal of the Order by this Board and a remand to the Regional Board with instructions to comply with the statute's requirements.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, in prior submission to this Board and to the Regional Board, and upon the Administrative Record as a whole, the Ag Waiver should be overruled by this Board and the Petitions of the agricultural parties granted.

Date: July 16, 2013

Respectfully submitted,

William Elliott

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby swear under penalty of perjury that I have served this COMMENTS OF JENSEN FAMILYU FARMS ET AL. by e-mail sent to each of the persons and entities at the addresses listed in Attachment A hereto on this 16TH Day of July, 2013 from San Luis Obispo, California 93445. I further swear that I am over the age of 18 and that I am not a party to the proceeding underlying the filing of this document. Christine Robertson I

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