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December 10, 2002

VIA FACSIMILE/E-MAIL/REGULAR MAIL

Mr. Andy Fecko Environmental Scientist State Water Resources Control Board Division of Water Rights 1001 I Street, 14th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814

Re: IID/SDCWA Joint Petition

Dear Mr. Fecko:

Attached please find IID's Comments/Opposition regarding WRO 2002-013. Despite the vote last night, IID is continuing with its Petition process. A copy of this letter and the attached Comments/Opposition have been served on all parties. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Mark J. Hattam

MJH:hmc Enclosure

cc: All Parties, w/encl. (See Service List.)

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12	STATE OF	CALIFORNIA
13	IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT	
	and SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY,	IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT
15	Petitioners.	COMMENTS/OPPOSITION RE ALL PETITIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
16		SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-013
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IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT COMMENTS/OPPOSITION REGARDING ALL PETITIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SWRCB ORDER WRO 2002-013

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1. INTRODUCTION

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Various entities who protested the joint petition by Imperial Irrigation District ("IID") and the San Diego County Water Authority ("SDCWA") have now filed Petitions for Reconsideration in a continued attempt to seek multiple rehearings of the same issues. Despite extensive evidentiary hearings, public workshops, and submittals on the initial Draft Decision, the same old arguments are now trotted out again, this time under the guise of "new facts" or "errors of law." SWRCB is well aware, though IID is not 100% in accord with the text of the Board's ultimate Decision in Order WRO 2002-013, that Decision nevertheless represents a reasoned and rational balancing of important interests, and it protects the environment as much as reasonable while still allowing a water transfer to occur.

IID provides this brief as a comment upon the pending Petitions for Reconsideration, and as opposition thereto. addresses most of the major points raised in the Petitions for Reconsideration, as opposed to providing separate briefing as to each. As to any points not addressed, IID does not, of course, acquiesce to the claims, but simply does not take the time to again address them here since they have been dealt with previously. IID also notes one area regarding mitigation water raised by Imperial County in which a response should be included in the order denying the reconsideration petitions.

2. GENERAL OVERVIEW

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Before getting into the particulars of the Petitioners' claims, it is important to keep a proper perspective on what is occurring in this transfer petition process. IID and SDCWA have come before the SWRCB as voluntary petitioners, attempting to produce a water transfer that would help both agency service areas and benefit the State. This transfer is especially timely, because it comes to fruition at a point in time when California is facing imminent threat of water reductions by virtue of junior right holders' long overuse of Colorado River water.

To effectively produce the volumes of water needed for the transfer, IID requires financial assistance to implement new system and on-farm conservation measures. SDCWA is willing to provide such assistance and to reap the benefit of the conserved water. However, such conservation would, by its nature, reduce runoff to the Salton Sea.

Before addressing the specific assertions of Petitioners regarding the Salton Sea later in this brief, it is imperative that all parties, the SWRCB, the State, and the federal government be reminded that IID has no duty whatsoever to order any set amount of water in any given year. IID's runoff to the Salton Sea is an accidental (and incidental) benefit of agriculture -- nothing more, and nothing less. There are no fish nor fowl in the Salton Sea region which possess a "right" to Colorado River water. Further, even IID itself does not hold its water rights for itself -- it holds them in trust for its landowners, as declared by the U.S. Supreme Court (Bryant v. Yellin, 447 U.S. 352, 371 (1980).

Water conservation is not something that this Board can or should prohibit, whether in the agricultural or urban context. Yet, despite the fact that IID believes it has an absolute right to lower its water use by conservation methods, it has been sensitive to the practical results of its runoff in keeping the Salton Sea alive for a few extra years, and to the political expediency of providing both federal and state governments extra time to decide what to do (if anything) with the Salton Sea. IID and co-petitioner SDCWA (as well as MWD and CVWD) have been willing to address replacement water and fallowing issues, even though they have significant disagreement on many such topics, all to try and help this transfer occur. This Board has also attempted to balance the competing interests in a manner that is fair to all and best for California, which includes mitigation water for the Sea.

Yet certain environmental groups and protestants demand more: more time, more money, more studies, more water. This transfer cannot be burdened with any more, or it will collapse of its own weight. That, of course, is exactly what such groups seek: to so overburden this transfer so that it cannot go forward. The SWRCB should not countenance such obstructionism, and should deny all the Petitions for Reconsideration, except for the one item noted below.

3. ANALYSIS OF ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Numerous supposed bases for reconsideration are asserted by the protestants, most of which deny the evidence from the

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Though the burdens placed on the transfer already have resulted in the "no" vote by IID's Board, the IID Petition continues forward since negotiations no doubt will continue.

hearings, and thus are without merit, with the exception of the first point dealt with below regarding mitigation water.

A. The Use of Water To Mitigate Conservation Activity Is A Permitted Use Incidental To IID's Current Uses

Imperial County's Petition for Reconsideration states on page 3:

The County also believes that under both state and federal law, the Board is authorized and required to determine that the use of Colorado River resources to sustain the Salton Sea and its shoreline is as proposed reasonable and beneficial.

Imperial County Petition For Reconsideration, p.3.

Assuming that the County means that the use of water to mitigate conservation activity as required by the Board is a reasonable and beneficial use by IID under its existing authorized use, IID concurs 100% and asks that the SWRCB, in its order denying the petitions for reconsideration, clearly state that the use of water to mitigate conservation—activity impacts on the Salton Sea as required by the Board is considered part of IID's present authorized use; no change in use approval is necessary; and such use is reasonable and beneficial. Why is this so vital? Because the Bureau of Reclamation is now telling IID that it cannot use its water as directed here; the Bureau asserts that any use to mitigate Salton Sea impacts is non-permissible. IID strongly disagrees with that position, and the SWRCB should as well — otherwise, this transfer and any others

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like it will never occur. The use of water to mitigate conservation impacts is an incidental use to the permitted use.

The federal components of the Law of the River only displace state water law to the extent inconsistent with the Boulder Canyon Project Act ("Project Act"). The Order acknowledges this principle, and also correctly acknowledges the extensive state law aspects of IID's present-perfected rights. But, as to the question of whether the use of Colorado River water to mitigate conservation and transfer impacts is allowable, the Draft fails to recognize that such use is **not** inconsistent with the Project Act.

Water Code § 1011 recognizes water conservation activities involving a reduction in irrigation use as the legal equivalent of reasonably and beneficially using water for irrigation purposes; "any cessation or reduction in the use of the appropriated water shall be deemed equivalent to a reasonable beneficial **use** of water." (Emphasis added.) Mitigation of environmental impacts resulting from conservation activities is merely a component of the conservation project itself, not a separate and direct use of water under the water right. Absent the conservation project, no mitigation use would occur. when IID lined canals pursuant to its 1988 agreement with MWD (IID Exh. 15), it mitigated any loss of habitat by replanting replacement habitat and irrigating that habitat. This was not the exercise of IID's water right for wildlife purposes, but merely the continued irrigation use associated with the conservation projects. Recently-amended Water Code section 1013 makes this point even more clear with respect to conservation

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activities involving fallowing. New section 1013(b) provides that, "'land fallowing conservation measures' means the generation of water to be made available for transfer or for environmental mitigation purposes by fallowing . . . "

Thus, the order denying reconsideration petitions should include language that IID's voluntary use of Colorado River water to mitigate the impacts of voluntary conservation activity is a use that is only part of the "conservation use" itself, or an incidental use in connection with the conservation activity.²

The Project Act expressly defers to state law to define the "use" of water: "Nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with such rights as the States had on December 21, 1928, either to the water within their borders or to adopt such policies and enact such laws as they deem necessary with respect to the appropriation, control and use of waters within their borders, except as modified by the Colorado River Compact or other interstate agreement." 43 U.S.C. § 617g. Federal law confirms a state's right to define the parameters of the permissible use of Colorado River water. The Arizona legislature defined artificial groundwater recharge as a legitimate use of water within the state of Arizona. Central Arizona Irr. and Drainage Dist. ("CAIDD") v. Lujan (D. Az. 1991) 764 F.Supp. 582, 592. The federal court concluded that such recharge was within the "municipal and industrial" use authorized by the federal Central Arizona Project contract with the Secretary:

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Re incidental use, <u>see Rundale v. The Delaware and Rariton Canal Co</u>. (1852) 55 U.S. 80, 93; <u>Peacock v. Payne</u> (1934) 1 Cal. 2d 104, 109; and SWRCB Order WR95-9 (1995) WL4186673 at p. 21.

<u>Id</u>. at 591.

Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP attorneys at law The allocation and preferences given to CAP water seems to be within the exclusive province of the Secretary of the Interior; once the preferences are already established, the possible uses of that water are governed by state law. Consequently, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to allocate CAP water to M&I users. Then M&I users may use their water for any use authorized by Arizona law, including recharge.

Thus, because California law defines the conservation of irrigation water as the continued use of water by the conserving water right holder pursuant to Water Code sections 1011, 1012 and 1017 (when transferred), and the use of water to mitigate the conservation activity is either part and parcel of the conservation use or a mere incident thereto, there is no relevance to the question whether the Law of the River would permit or preclude the direct use of Colorado River water for a Water Code section 1707 purpose. Conservation activities and incidental use as defined under state law are not inconsistent with the expressly-permissible irrigation use of all of IID's water right.

In summary, the County of Imperial's request for a determination in the Order that use of mitigation water for the Salton Sea is an IID permitted use that is reasonable and beneficial is correct. IID suggests that the following language be inserted where appropriate in the section on such mitigation water:

If IID meets its obligation to supply replacement water to the Salton Sea as

mitigation for conservation activity during the 15-year period required herein by use of its Colorado River entitlements which have been permitted by this State, then such use is deemed within the scope of its existing permitted use and is incidental thereto, and it is also deemed reasonable and beneficial.

Such language will clarify this issue, and will make clear that under California law such mitigation does not put the water rights of a transferring entity at risk.

B. Protestants Falsely Assert That California

Faces No Imminent Water Shortage, And That

Findings Of Overriding Considerations Are

Thus Not Merited

The combined environmental group brief (Audubon, Defenders of Wildlife, Planning and Conservation League, Sierra Club, and National Wildlife Federation; collectively the "Audubon Brief") makes the argument (pp.12-15) that the SWRCB based its finding that California is facing a water shortage (without the transfer) on no substantial evidence, and that the Interim Surplus Guidelines do not require QSA execution. This position is not only nonsensical, it ignores reams of evidence presented to the SWRCB on this issue. In this section, we summarize some of the

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proof, but simply enough credible evidence that a reasoned decision can be based thereon. <u>See</u>, for example, California Administrative Code, Title 14, Section 15384(a), which states the following: "Substantial evidence as used in these guidelines means enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached." The SWRCB noted in Order No. WQ 92-14,

The "substantial evidence" standard is not one of conclusive

key evidence, showing that the Audubon Brief is completely in error.

1. The Evidence Is Dispositive: California Is Facing An Imminent Water Cutback

The SWRCB heard testimony by numerous witnesses regarding the extensive benefits of this transfer, including the United States facilitating a "soft landing" for California reductions from 5.2 to 4.4 million AFY over 15 years by preserving the availability of "Interim Surplus" water.

Absent the Transfer and QSA, and the ensuing Interim Surplus Guidelines promulgated by the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), California must immediately limit its Colorado River water use to 4.4 million AFY. The evidence presented was overwhelming as to the problems facing California in such event:

(a) Steve MaCaulay, Chief Deputy Director at DWR, testified that the IID-SDCWA Transfer is a key component of the California Water Plan.

Transcript, April 23, 2002, p. 112(22)-(24). He also testified that if the QSA is not signed and going forward by the end of this year, California will be limited to 4.4 million AFY, "resulting in a very significant drop of [water] in [sic] almost overnight in the amount of water that California can take from the river." Id. at p. 114(18)-(20). Additionally, Mr. MaCaulay noted that such a

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¹⁹⁹² Cal.Env. LEXIS 20, that: "substantial evidence does not mean proof beyond a doubt or even a preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence upon which a reasoned decision may be based." Id. at 6.

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reduction would "immediately put more pressure on the [San Francisco Bay] Delta, [requiring] more deliveries from the State Water Project." pp. 115(23)-116(1). Mr. MaCaulay also testified that failure to implement the California Plan, which includes the Transfer and Settlement, would have catastrophic consequences for California and for the CalFed process involving habitat enhancement in the San Francisco Bay Delta. Id. at p. 116(14)-(23);

- Dennis Underwood, an MWD Vice President, testified (b) in a similar vein, pointing out that the implementation of the QSA was a key component of the California Plan (Transcript, April 23, 2002, p. 121(11)-(17), and that the Transfer and Settlement are absolutely critical for California. Id. at pp. 130(9)-131(6);
- Tom Levy, General Manager of CVWD, reiterated the (C) same points made by Mr. Underwood and Mr. MaCaulay: the QSA is essential for California (Transcript, April 23, 2002, p. 141(17)-(21) and pp. 142(20)-143(1). He also noted that SWRCB approval of the Transfer and Settlement was a condition precedent to implementation of the QSA. Id. at p. 143(10)-(18). Mr. Levy also pointed out another reason the Transfer and Settlement were vital for CVWD: CVWD has a serious groundwater overdraft problem which is alleviated by the

L	Transfer	r and Settlem	ent.	<u>Id</u> . at	pp.	140(23)-
2	141(10);	;				
3	(d) <u>Dr. Bart</u>	ton Thompson,	a pro	fessor	at	Stanford

University and an expert on water resource matters, testified that the Transfer and Settlement were vital for California for three reasons: (a) they help Southern California meet its water needs and thus remove pressure on the San Francisco Bay Delta; (b) they resolve numerous longstanding divisive water disputes; and (c) they are important models for further long-term water transfers in California. Transcript, April 24, 2002, pp. 363(19)-366(24).

For the Audubon Brief to claim, in the face of such testimony from numerous witnesses, that the SWRCB is indulging in "speculation" without "substantial evidence" is completely unfounded.

2. The Bureau Of Reclamation's Guidelines
Clearly State The Ramifications To
California If The QSA And Its
Constituent Transfer(s) Are Not In Place
By January 1, 2003

The Audubon Brief also asserts that the Interim Guidelines ("Guidelines") promulgated by the BOR do not necessitate a cutback for California, and that the QSA is not required under those Guidelines. Nothing could be further from the truth, since the BOR itself issued a clarification explaining that in fact its

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Guidelines do in fact require implementation of the QSA by the end of this year.

The BOR has answered allegations such as those raised by Audubon regarding the Guidelines in the BOR's Notice ("Notice") in the Federal Register of June 19, 2002. Federal Register/Vol. 67, No. 118, June 19, 2002/Notices, pp. 41733-41735.

In the Notice, the BOR makes the following points clear:

- (a) Sections 5(B) and 5(C) of the Guidelines
 "established <u>independent conditions</u> for
 performance of certain actions by entities in
 California " <u>Id</u>. at 41733 (emphasis added);
- Section 5(B) addresses the QSA, and states the (b) requirement that it be signed by December 31, The Notice says that the "QSA is a critical 2002. agreement among the California parties to reduce California's reliance on surplus water from the Colorado River." Id. at 41734. It then points out that some commentators [such as Audubon here] have asserted that failure to sign the QSA by the deadline specified will not affect surplus determinations for 2003 and/or that the Guidelines would be terminated if the QSA were not signed by the end of this year. However, the BOR make clear in the Notice that such contentions are incorrect: "Such suggestions are inconsistent with the plain language of the Guidelines as adopted." Id. at

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41734. In fact, the BOR states that the effect of the QSA not being finalized by the end of this year will in fact be the suspension of the "soft landing" created by the special surplus water currently being made available by the Interim Surplus Guidelines, though the Guidelines as a whole will not be. Id. at 41734; and

requirement that certain "Benchmark Quantities" for California agricultural use must be reached in specified three-year intervals. Id. at 41734.

Just as with Section 5(B), if this independent condition is not met, the "soft landing" for California is at risk: "As with the requirements in section 5(B), section 5(C) also establishes the implications for surplus determinations in the event that the Benchmark quantity conditions for performance are not met." Id. at 41734.

As stated in the Notice, the "soft landing" provisions in Sections 2(B)(1) and 2(B)(2) of the Guidelines will be suspended if either 5(B) (QSA signing) or 5(C) (Benchmark Quantities) are not met. The BOR states that the QSA signing and the Benchmark Quantities are each independent requirements, and thus a failure of either negates the efficacy of Sections 2(B)(1) and 2(B)(2) of the Guidelines.

The Audubon Brief's allegations of "no substantial evidence" are thus incorrect.

3. Given The Above Facts, Findings Of Overriding Consideration Are Proper

Because of the above-noted import of this transfer, the QSA, and all the associated agreements, it is imperative that the SWRCB's findings of overriding consideration be left undisturbed. The water situation in California is in fact critical, and abundant evidence was presented to the SWRCB of this fact.

C. The Protestants Incorrectly Assert That IID

And SDCWA Should Face This Entire Process

Again In Less Than 15 Years, That 15 years Is

Not Enough Time To "Save The Sea", And That

The Baseline Analysis Violates CEQA

Numerous parties ask this Board to either directly, or indirectly, force IID and SDCWA to incur massive costs and effort in getting this transfer program underway, only to be subject to a "Let's look at it again in 13+ years and if we don't like it we will then stop it" re-review. The main supposed bases for this proposal are that perhaps the Salton Sea will still not yet be "saved," and that the baseline used by the EIR is flawed. However, the Audubon Brief itself states what every participant in the hearing knows will happen to the Sea, absent massive governmental intervention:

[S]alinity in the Sea will increase over time, because the Sea is terminal.

Audubon Brief, p.6.

Simply put, IID will not go forward with the proposed

transfer if it is subject to huge exposure for stranded

conservation costs. For IID to do so would be irresponsible, and

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neither the SWRCB, the State, nor the federal government should expect or demand such impropriety. If the SWRCB were to cater to the environmental lobby and require additional later CEQA review, with the option of nixing the entire transfer 13-15 years from now, IID would be unable to commit to the transfer. has bent to extraordinary political pressure and considered fallowing to a certain limited extent, it would also be implementing substantial conservation measures in that 15-year period, and the long-term revenue stream is necessary to pay the costs. The SWRCB is well aware, both from this proceeding and prior proceedings, that such conservation is expensive and requires substantial financial payments over the long term of the transfer. For IID to undertake such conservation spending only to have there be a risk that 15 years from now there will be further proceedings which could cancel the transfer would be an enormous gamble that IID and its ratepayers should not, and will not, take.

The approach taken by the SWRCB, in contrast, which gives the Sea 15 years of 100% replacement water, and after that makes overriding consideration determinations, is more than sufficient. The evidence in the record is quite substantial that the Sea is on the verge of collapse. Here is a table that lists just some of the evidence presented at the hearing:

24	The EIR/EIS Model Prediction	What The Environmentalists
		Themselves Have Said
25		
0.6	1. "Available evidence	1. Fishery collapse under
26	1. "Available evidence indicates that Corvina	current trends is predicted
27	reproduction could fail at any time, and, at a salinity level	between 2015 and 2035. Salton
		Sea Authority Exhibit 18, p.6,
28	of 50 g/L, it will fail along	"Current Salinity" slide from

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1	The EIR/EIS Model Prediction	What The Environmentalists Themselves Have Said
2	with that of the croaker and	January 2002. See Transcript,
3	sargo, leaving tilapia as the	May 14, 2002, p. 1623(13)-(22)
3	only sport-fish species By	(emphasis added).
4	60 g/L, the salinity tolerance of tilapia reproduction will	
5	have been exceeded: (Page 3.2-	
_	147 of IID Exh. 55 and	
6	incorporated in IID Final	
7	EIR/EIS at p. 1-1.) With no project, "the salinity of the	
8	Salton Sea would exceed the	
	level at which sargo , gulf	
9	croaker, and tilapia could	
10	complete their life cycles in 2008, 2015, and 2023,	
1 1	respectively. Under the	
11	Proposed Project, the thresholds	
12	for sargo, gulf croaker, and tilapia would be exceeded 1, 5,	
13	and 11 years earlier than under	
	the Baseline (in 2007, 2010, and	
14	2012, respectively)." (Page 3.2-149 of IID Exh. 55 and	
15	incorporated in IID Exh. 93	
16	Final EIR/EIS at p. 1-1.)	
		"Proposed water transfers may
17		reduce the time needed for
18		implementing salinity controls
19		from 15-30 years to 5-7 years."
		PCL Exh. 1, p. 22, from March 2002. (Emphasis added.)
20		
21		"[A]t current rates of salt
22		loading of 4 million tons of salts per year, the Salton Sea
		will be unsuitable for fish and
23		other wildlife in 15 years."
24		IID Exh. 72, p. 1, written by Dr. Timothy Krantz in 1999
٠.		(Transcript, May 14, 2002,
25		p. 1640(14)-(22). (Emphasis
26		added.)
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P		
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The "status quo" of the Salton Sea is that of a sick and dying habitat:

The Salton Sea, California's largest body of water, is in trouble. . . . The Salton Sea has become a fatal attraction as a result of its polluted and saline water.

. . .

[D]ue to its deteriorating water quality, the number of visitors to the Sea over the past 30 years has understandably declined.

. .

[T]he Salton Sea may never be swimmable again due to the reality that significant amounts of wastewater continue to flow into it.

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Defenders of Wildlife Salton Sea Position Statement, IID Exh. 79, pp. 1 and 4.

By the foregoing evidentiary recitations, IID does not mean to imply that nothing should be done about the Salton Sea. In fact, IID is a member of the Salton Sea Authority, and it supports outside intervention to preserve the Sea. However, if the federal and/or state governments cannot make a decision in 15 years, then there is nothing to indicate that they would in 20 years, or 30 years, or 50 years. To ask IID and SDCWA to go forward with a transfer, with large cost exposure, only to be subject to the "plug being pulled" by new environmental review and hearings is unrealistic. The SWRCB's 15-year "window of opportunity" for the Sea is more than fair. In that time the citizens of this State and this Nation must decide, via the democratic process, if they want to fund the rescue of the Sea. If they decide not to, it will not be because this Board has

provided too little time, but because the voters and their elected representatives do not want to spend the money to do so.

Finally, in regards to the criticisms of the baseline for the Salton Sea, they are unfounded. The Final EIR's sensitivity studies show that even with varying assumptions, there is no dramatic shift in the baseline.

Additionally, the argument that the baseline must be a "snapshot" is simply in error. In a simple project, such as construction of a commercial building, the Baseline normally equals the existing conditions as of a fixed date (the date of publication of the NOP) on a "snapshot" basis. However, the proposed project at issue is complex, with built-in flexibility, and will be implemented for up to 75 years. The actual physical conditions at the Salton Sea that may be affected require a more refined and complex approach to identify impacts over the 75-year In particular, existing conditions at the Salton Sea include identifiable trends which will affect Sea salinity and elevation over the 75-year period. A projected Baseline allows future changes caused by existing conditions to be distinguished from project effects. This distinction is important because CEQA does not require IID to mitigate effects which are not caused by the project. Section 15125(a) of the Guidelines does not mandate that a frozen snapshot of existing conditions be used. As noted in an authoritative text on CEQA compliance:

Both the Guidelines and following Discussion provide that physical conditions at the time of the [NOP] normally constitute the baseline for determining impacts, but a lead agency may determine that another baseline is more appropriate, either for overall evaluation of a project's impacts or for evaluation of a particular project impact. For example, if

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it is known that a certain surrounding environmental condition will either improve or degrade by the time the project is implemented, the lead agency may have a basis for selecting a different baseline for evaluating environmental impacts related to that condition. If the lead agency does elect a different baseline, the lead agency should be careful to explain in the EIR why a different baseline has been selected and to summarize the evidence or determination surrounding the selection of a different baseline.⁴

The existing conditions of the Salton Sea reflect a historical trend of increasing salinity that will continue into the future, absent a major intervention aimed at restoration. The trend evidences both declining water quality and habitat values. This significant trend was recognized in the 2001 Draft EIS/EIR for the Salton Sea Restoration Project (SS Restoration Draft EIR/EIS, IID Exh. 69), which also utilized an earlier version of the same Salton Sea Accounting Model used for the Draft and Final EIR/EIS. As noted in that SS Restoration Draft EIS/EIR (IID Exh. 69):

The Salton Sea ecosystem is under stress from increasing salinity, nutrient loading, oxygen depletion, and temperature fluctuations that may be threatening the reproductive ability of some biota, particularly sportfish species, and also causing additional ecosystem health problems. There are indications that the deteriorating environmental conditions may be contributing to the prominence of avian disease at the Sea. Without restoration, the ecosystem at the Sea will continue to deteriorate.

Executive Summary, page ES-1.

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Kostka, Stephen L. and Michael H. Zischke, 2002, <u>California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)</u>, § 12.16, updated January 2002, p. 489. <u>See also</u>, Remy, Michael H. et al., <u>Guide to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)</u>, 10th ed., 1999, p. 165.

It is appropriate to reflect this trend in the Baseline because it is an element of existing conditions, and it is also appropriate to differentiate adverse changes in conditions at the Sea resulting from the ongoing trend from changes caused by the Transfer and Settlement. The Final EIR utilizes a reasonable method of presenting the Baseline and identifying the project impacts, and is the result of substantial time, effort and expense. It is well within the discretion of the IID as the CEQA Lead Agency to adopt this analytical method.

In <u>Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors</u> (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, the Court recognized a lead agency's discretion to establish an appropriate baseline:

Because the chief purpose of the EIR is to provide detailed information regarding the significant environmental effects of the proposed project on the "physical conditions which exist within the area," it follows that the existing conditions must be determined, to the extent possible, in the EIR itself. . . . [Citations] . . . On the other hand, the agency has the discretion to resolve factual issues and to make policy decisions. If the determination of a baseline condition requires choosing between conflicting expert opinions or differing methodologies, it is the function of the agency to make those choices based on all of the evidence.

Id. at 120.

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The Court in <u>Save Our Peninsula</u> also rejected the theory that the baseline must be rigidly determined as of a specific date, the date when the NOP is filed:

. . . [T]he date for establishing baseline cannot be a rigid one. Environmental conditions may vary from year to year and in some cases it is necessary to consider conditions over a range of time periods. In some cases, conditions closer to the date the project is approved are more relevant to a

determination whether the project's impacts will be significant.

Id. at 125.

Citing County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999), 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 955, and CEQA Guidelines

Section 15151, the Save Our Peninsula Court cautioned that an adequate baseline description requires more than raw data; it also requires sufficient information and analysis to enable the decision-makers to make intelligent choices.⁵

In light of the inherent variability in the hydrological conditions at the Salton Sea, which is verified by historical records, using a "snapshot" Baseline which focuses on the physical conditions on a specific date (or other limited point in time) is not an accurate or reasonable method of reflecting existing conditions. In addition, a "snapshot" approach does not reflect predictable future changes caused by existing trends over the project term. Following the direction allowed by applicable law, the Final EIR provides a reasoned methodology and analysis to allow the Lead Agencies to adopt the described Baseline and to identify and assess project impacts in a meaningful way.

D. The Continued Attempt To Claim That

Irrigation Runoff To The Salton Sea Creates A

"Public Trust" Resource Is In Error

Various claims are again raised in the Petitions for Reconsideration that the Salton Sea is a "public trust" and thus the SWRCB should mandate continued inflows (and thus no water conservation) by IID.

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⁵ Id. 124.

The SWRCB's Order does not make an "error of law" in stating 1 that § 1736 of the Water Code "effectively" codifies the concerns 2 that would be inherent in a public trust analysis. A fair 3 reading of the Order is not that § 1736 and the Public Trust 4 Doctrine are 100% co-extensive, as the Audubon Brief suggests is 5 being said, but that "effectively" the same concerns are inherent 6 in both the statute and the Public Trust Doctrine. This is certainly correct, since just as with the statute's 8 "unreasonableness" standard, the Public Trust Doctrine itself 9 10 requires balancing of the public's interests in certain bodies of water with the need for a supposed action that might affect it. 11 For example, the SWRCB may approve an appropriator's application 12 that will have some adverse impact on public trust interests 13 where the SWRCB has given due consideration to the impacts but 14 15 found that the public interest in approving the application outweighs the expected injury. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 446. 17 See also State of California v. Riverside County Superior Court (2000) 18 78 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1031, n.18: "For example, the state's 19 2.0 interest in agriculture may require that water rights be awarded 21 with respect to a navigable waterway, even though the result will 2.2 be deleterious to such public trust uses in the waterway as fishing, commerce, or even recreation; however, as the court 23 explains, the decision should be made after considering all 24 25 factors."

Further, as has been held by this very Board, the Public Trust Doctrine does not mandate continued agricultural inflows to the Salton Sea. In its Order WR 84-12 (1984 Cal.Env. LEXIS 31),

the SWRCB ruled that IID cannot be compelled by the Public Trust Doctrine to drain irrigation water into the Salton Sea:

Upon its admission to the Union in 1850, California acquired title as trustee to navigable waterways and underlying lands . . . No such title or public trust easement was acquired to the property underlying the present Salton Sea since the Sea was not created until 1905 [by accidental diversion of the Colorado River]. Therefore, regardless of the extent to which the public trust doctrine may or may not apply to an artificial body of water, it is apparent that the doctrine does not justify continued inundation of property to which no public trust easement attaches.

11 Order WR 84-12, p. 12, fn.1.

This prior ruling of the SWRCB is in accord with the overall law in California on the Public Trust Doctrine. See Colberg,

Inc. v. State of California (1967) 67 Cal.2d 408, 416; National

Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County (1983)

33 Cal.3d 419, 433.

Thus, if the SWRCB chooses to address the Public Trust issue, as sought by the Audubon Brief (though it need not do so), it should rule consistently with its earlier decision in this very matter re IID's use: that the Public Trust Doctrine does not require continued agricultural runoff. 6

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Two points worth are also noting in the "public trust" context: (1) certain environmentalists recently have been asserting before State officials that the SWRCB has now "changed its mind" regarding the Public Trust Doctrine and the Salton Sea. To clarify that this Order does not somehow detract from the above-quoted decision by the SWRCB, it may be helpful to add in the Public Trust section that, "Nothing herein is intended to negate prior SWRCB statements regarding the Public Trust Doctrine and the Salton Sea."; (2) the Audubon Brief claims that IID "continues to appropriate the Salton Sea's source waters under the State's authority." This statement is false on two counts. First, the Colorado River is no more the "Salton Sea's source waters" than the arctic ice cap is the

E. The Air Mitigation Issues Are Fully Resolved

A number of complaints are raised by petitioners along the lines of: (a) local agencies still have jurisdiction; (b) local agencies need funding to monitor transfer effects; and (c) more needs to be done re potential air pollution. Each argument is in error.

First, there is nothing in the Board's Order which indicates it has deprived any agency of jurisdiction. That is self-evident. The Order need not recite each agency that it has not deprived of jurisdiction. Rather, the Order properly states what affirmative actions must occur to satisfy this Board for transfer approval -- nothing more and nothing less.

Second, re funding, certain petitioners cite Health & Safety Code § 42316 and ask this Board to order IID and/or SDCWA to fund their agency. Imperial County Air Pollution Control District Brief, pp.4-5. However, § 42316 is a legislative decision, via statute, to allow certain measures to be imposed by the Great Basin Air Pollution Control District on the City of Los Angeles. It is not a funding measure for the Great Basin Air Pollution Control District. Further, the statute is a proper exercise of the Legislature's power. For this Board to order that IID and/or

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time, then many waters are interconnected and are the "source" of other bodies of water. The far-fetched historic speculation that the Audubon Brief and its authors ask this Board to embark upon is extreme, and should not be accepted. Second, it is a half-truth to say that IID appropriates water under the "State's authority," as asserted. Though IID does in fact have state permits, it also has federal water rights, and it really appropriates water in trust for its landowners, as noted above. Such water rights are held in trust for such particular persons and lands, and not for the State generally.

"source" of the Great Lakes. If one wants to deal in geologic

SDCWA fund any or all of the work of other agencies who wish to monitor this transfer would be inappropriate.

Finally, the Board has already made extensive allowance for mitigation of any air pollution problems. No more is necessary.

F. There Is No Application Of Water Code § 1810 Here

Imperial County asserts in its brief that Water Code § 1810 mandates county of origin analysis. Though IID does believe that the SWRCB should look at economic factors for other reasons (such as whether the costs of conservation are too high in a reasonable use context, and whether any fallowing requirement would harm the County), § 1810 itself has no bearing here. That portion of the Water Code deals with "wheeling" of water through pipes that have certain unused capacities. Here, SDCWA and MWD have entered into their own transfer agreement, which is not a § 1810 transaction.

4. CONCLUSION

In summary, except for the clarifying language regarding mitigation water, the Petitions for Reconsideration should be denied.

Dated: December 10, 2002 IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT

By:

David L. Osias, Attorney

pavia I. oblas, necome,

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Division of Water Rights State Water Resources Control Board PO Box 2000 Sacramento, CA 95812-2000

Attn: Andy Fecko

Re: "IID/SDCWA Petition"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 501 West Broadway, Ninth Floor, San Diego, California 92101-3577.

On December 10, 2002, I served the following:

Imperial Irrigation District Comments/Opposition re All Petitions for Reconsideration of SWRCB Order WRO 2002-013

on the "List of Parties To Exchange Information" by electronic transmission (where e-mail address is indicated) or via overnight delivery.

Executed on December 10, 2002, at San Diego, California.

Catherine A. Schiaffo
(Type or print name)

(Signature)

LIST OF PARTIES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION Imperial Irrigation District/San Diego County Water Authority Water Transfer Hearing

(Note: the parties whose E-mail addresses are listed below agreed to accept electronic service, pursuant to the rules specified in the Hearing Notice.)

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